Public opinion formation plays a very important role in economic policy development. Opinions put forward in various social platforms offered by the media and the Internet have a large impact on international treaty negotiations. In particular this seems to be the case for international negotiations regarding the abatement of greenhouse gasses. In this paper we argue that social opinion formation can be represented as part of a game-theoretic equilibrium concept that transcends the standard Nash equilibrium concept. We discuss its application to treaty negotiations in the context of a model of the tragedy of the commons representing the international environmental situation. We conclude that social opinion formation in most cases has a significant impact on their outcomes and effectiveness.
The environment and social opinion formation
The current climate debate and the negotiations over global emission reductions bring up multiple pressing questions for economists and game theorists. Economists can contribute to the public debate on these issues by clarifying the incentives of decision makers, in particular the participants in such negotiations regarding global emission reductions. In this paper we discuss an innovative approach for understanding the various influences on negotiators. Central among these is the influence of public discourse on the negotiations. Negotiators, representing certain populations of economic subjects, are usually strongly influenced by public opinion formation regarding global warming and the effects of emission abatement on environment and the economy.
In this paper we attempt to model tractably the influence of public discourse on negotiation processes in a common resource game. Our approach takes us away from standard game theoretic equilibrium concepts such as Nash and Bayesian equilibrium, and instead focuses on the direct incorporation of ambiguity and social influence on game theoretic decision processes. In particular, we show that certain social influences on opinion formation might guide decision makers to a more efficient equilibrium state than standard concepts would support.
We use the standard common property resource or tragedy of the commons game as a vehicle to study the incentives that negotiators of global emission reductions face. The tragedy of the commons acts in many respects as a metaphor for the issues facing such negotiations. In this normal form game there is a stark difference between the socially optimal or Pareto efficient state and the standard Nash equilibrium state in which players act only in their self-interest. This fundamental problem has already been addressed in the literature on environmental economics.
In that literature, authors have examined a linear model of common property resources management, with emphasis on self-enforcing and stable international environmental agreements (Barrett, 2003; Ulph, 2004; Kolstad, 2007) . These contributions study coalition formation and dynamic negotiation processes, incorporate uncertainty with respect to the marginal cost of the use of the commons, and introduce dynamic accumulation of pollution stock. However, they use a restricted set of game theoretic equilibrium concepts, such as Nash equilibrium and subgame perfection.
A major drawback of these equilibrium concepts is that all of these, and many other, equilibrium concepts assume that individuals evaluate outcomes by means of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) theory (Savage, 1954) . Experimental evidence that urges the consideration of departures from expected utility is well-established. The evidence presented by, e.g., Ellsberg (1961) and Camerer and Weber (1992) questions whether standard probabilities can capture the nature of individual beliefs. Further, Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper (2006) discuss an experiment in which subjects experience ambiguity due to the identity of the other player in a two-player game, who could be sophisticated or not; when facing the unsophisticated player, subjects felt more ambiguous and played more conservatively.
A major alternative to SEU is the theory of decision making under ambiguity (Schmeidler, 1989) . The basic idea dates back to the work of Knight (1921) on uncertainty: individuals cannot know precisely the probabilities of all payoff-relevant events. Combining this with the mathematical theory of capacities, which are probabilities that can sum up to less than unity, resulted into the theory of Choquet Expected Utility (CEU). The theory postulates that individuals maximize an expected utility where the expectation is taken using a capacity; not a probability distribution. Since a capacity yields "probabilities" that don't necessarily add to unity, it can be used to describe the degree to which the individual's beliefs are ambiguous. The farther below unity the sum of all capacities is from unity, the more ambiguous the belief system these capacities represent.
Founded on CEU, the ambiguity equilibrium concept of Eichberger and Kelsey (2000) targets the analysis of games of complete information played by players who are affected by ambiguity in their beliefs. The presence of ambiguity implies that a player is not confident about his or her subjective probability assignment to the various states of the world that may arise. Thus, these players maximize an expected payoff based on a capacity rather than a probability distribution to represent the probabilistic evaluation of the actions of others made by each player. Recently, a particular variation of the ambiguity equilibrium concept-based on so-called neo-additive capacities-has been developed in Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007) , Eichberger and Kelsey (2006), Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper (2007) , and Eichberger and Kelsey (2007) . Given the particulars of the common pool game of the emission negotiations, ambiguity equilibrium under neo-additive capacities is arguably the proper solution concept to apply.
As shown by Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007) , in ambiguity equilibrium under neo-additive capacities, players weigh three terms in their payoff functions. One represents their most optimistic assessment of what the others will play, the second the most pessimistic assessment of what the others will play, and the third their standard expected utility payoff. The weight with which the first term is considered is called the "degree of optimism", and the weight of the second term the "degree of pessimism".
Here, in the context of the tragedy of the commons, we consider the social influence on the attitudes of players, in particular their optimistic and pessimistic assessments of the behavior of the other players in the game. In this regard, we recognize that negotiators are affected by the parties they represent as well as the dynamics of the negotiations themselves. The first factor refers to public opinion formation in the media about the attitudes and actions of the other parties in the negotiations. The second factor points at the internal dynamics of the negotiations and the resulting assessments of how the other negotiators will select their actions. This refers in particular to the coordination of the belief systems of the various players in the game itself.
In the tragedy of the commons game, we modify the ambiguity equilibrium concept under neo-additive capacities to reflect the social determination of both the pessimistic and optimistic attitudes of the players. We introduce a social opinion as a given rule that assigns to any payoff function and individual strategy an expected payoff. The social opinion thus describes some belief about the actually realized payoff level given the payoff function of the player and her chosen strategy. Social opinions reflect how the players believe that the other players in the game affect this actually realized payoff. The main departure from the existing literature is that we consider that these belief systems are socially determined through social opinion formation. In that regard, all players are assumed to be subject to the same social opinions.
We consider two separate social opinion rules: One rule describes the pessimistic attitudes of the players in the commons game and one rule represents the optimistic attitudes of these same players. For both pessimistic and optimistic social opinions we consider two formulations.
The first formulation is that of the standard ambiguity formulation introduced by Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007) based on, respectively, the global minimum and maximum payoffs. In this regard, both attitudes reflect maximal antagonism among the participants in the commons game. We show that these extreme social opinions result in a variety of possible outcomes. If both players have the same degrees of optimism and pessimism, social opinion formation can guide the negotiations to a Pareto optimal state. This requires finding a delicate balance between optimism and pessimism. However, if the held degrees of optimism and pessimism are asymmetric, Pareto optimality is longer achievable although inefficiency levels can be reduced by appropriate steering. Our results can ideally be used to guide social opinion formation and steer outcomes to higher efficiency levels.
Second, we consider modified social opinions that reflect a lower level of antagonism among the players, that corresponds to a more practical attitude towards pessimism and optimism in the context of such negotiation processes. Under these social opinions, outcomes are less ambiguous and straightforward policy suggestions can be made. These social opinions are based on the leadership role that the player in question assumes within the negotiation process itself. If the player believes that she has a position of leadership as a first mover in such negotiations, this is modeled as her optimistic beliefs. If the player believes that she has a follower role in the negotiations, this is reflected in her pessimistic beliefs. Again, these optimistic and pessimistic beliefs are formulated through social opinions, which in turn are based on the standard Stackelberg model of leadership in duopolistic market games.
1 Although optimistic beliefs result in conflict and a reduced level of social efficiency, the assumption of fully pessimistic beliefs based on this leader-follower social opinion results into full Pareto optimality under symmetric degrees of optimism and pessimism. Moreover, higher degrees of pessimism result unambiguously in higher levels of efficiency through the reduction of overuse of the commons. It is this last result that points to the potential value of this game theoretic analysis of the commons game. Indeed, it shows that if public opinion formation results into a moderately pessimistic view on the role of a negotiator in the emission control debate, there actually will result a socially superior equilibrium state.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the game theoretic tools and equilibrium concepts, including the notion of a social opinion. Next we consider the tragedy of the commons game and determine its social opinion equilibria under extreme social opinions. In Section 4 we derive the social opinion equilibria of the commons game under leader-follower social opinions. Section 5 concludes.
Introducing Social Opinions
We consider non-cooperative games in normal form with two players, denoted by 1, 2 or by i and −i; we abuse notation by also using i to refer to an arbitrarily chosen player when this does not introduce confusion. For each player i we denote by S i player i's strategy set and define S = S 1 × S 2 as the set of strategy tuples. Finally, for each player i we introduce a payoff function π i : S → R. The game can now be represented as a pair (S , π), where π = (π 1 , π 2 ) : S → R 2 .
A social opinion equilibrium concept can be developed from the ambiguity equilibrium notion introduced in Eichberger and Kelsey (2000). We reformulate the ambiguity equilibrium concept to fit with the understanding of ambiguity as a socially perturbed behavioral rule of every player. In Eichberger and Kelsey (2000) ambiguity is introduced through four elements for each player i who participates in a game. For player i this concerns the quadruplet (M i , λ i ; m i , γ i ), where:
Optimistic beliefs. Each player i formulates well-defined optimistic expectations with regard to her payoffs in the game. These expectations describe the best that can occur in the game concerning this player. The optimistic payoff function of player i is the function M i : S i → R assigning to every strategy x i ∈ S i of player i its maximally expected payoff
Now the weight λ i ∈ [0, 1] represents the weight that player i puts on her optimistic beliefs, in other words, the degree of optimism of player i. If λ i = 0, player i has no expectation that she will receive maximal payoffs in the game, while λ i = 1 refers to the other extreme case that player i is fully convinced that she will only receive maximal payoffs.
Pessimistic beliefs. Similarly, each player i formulates pessimistic expectations with regard to her payoffs in the game. These expectations describe the worst that this player can imagine happening to her in the game. The pessimistic payoff function of player i is the function m i : S i → R assigning to every strategy x i ∈ S i of player i the minimally expected payoff
Now the weight γ i ∈ [0, 1] represents the weight that player i puts on her pessimistic beliefs, in other words, player i's degree of pessimism. If γ i = 0, player i has no expectation that she will receive minimal payoffs in the game, while γ i = 1 refers to the other extreme case that player i is fully convinced that she will only receive minimal payoffs.
is proper if for every player i it holds that λ i + γ i 1, where
is the degree of ambiguity of player i. This allows us to introduce the equilibrium concept that underlies the rest of our analysis:
Definition 2.1 A strategy tuple x ∈ S is an ambiguity equilibrium in the game (S , π) for the proper belief system
x is a Nash equilibrium in the modified game (S , π), where π i : S → R for each player i is a modified payoff function given by
From this definition it follows that, if the degree of ambiguity is zero, the modified payoff formulation (1) reduces to the standard payoff function. As pointed out in the papers by Eichberger and Kelsey, the modified payoff function (1) is in fact the Choquet integral of the payoff function for a neo-additive capacity based on the ambiguity represented in the belief system Kelsey, and Schipper (2007) states that for every pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the modified game there is a pure strategy equilibrium under ambiguity in which each player i has degree of optimism λ i and of pessimism γ i . This paper and Eichberger and Kelsey (2000), Eichberger and Kelsey (2006) are good introductions to the theory of equilibrium under ambiguity. Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007) provide an axiomatic foundation for the equilibrium under ambiguity that underlies the ambiguity equilibrium as defined here. Note that the definition of equilibrium under ambiguity for more than two players is more subtle than a direct extension of the one just given. We refer to Eichberger and Kelsey (2000) for a discussion of the subtleties involved. We only consider two-player games in this paper and leave extensions to more players for future work.
Our purpose here is to prepare the ground for the practical application of the equilibrium under ambiguity, rather than to refine its theory, and to introduce a formalization of a social opinion and an associated equilibrium concept. Our idea is to explore how the components of the model may be affected by social (or public) opinion, as well as past experience, in a model that is sufficiently simple and compelling as to have a hope of practical application in the field of environmental economics, and, more generally, in public economics.
First, assume that the game (S , π) is such that S i = X for each i, where X is some common strategy set. A game satisfying this property is denoted by Γ = (X 2 , π).
Second, we interpret the players to be countries and, so, we define the equilibrium concept to allow asymmetry in the degrees of optimism and pessimism. The asymmetry is intended to capture into our simple model differing world views, such as a very optimistic view of the effects of global warming, as generally seen in the behavior of the US in international negotiations, and a pessimistic view as seen almost everywhere else. Admittedly, this may appear to be an oversimplification, but the study of international responses to environmental change deals with such complex issues we feel a simple approach is best, as long as it captures a relevant aspect of the game-theoretic interaction. The emphasis we place on simplicity in modeling is shared by some prominent environmental economists-see, for instance, Barrett (2003) .
Definition 2.2 Let Γ = (X 2 , π) be some game with a common strategy set.
(a) In the game Γ, a social opinion rule is a mapping F : X × (R) X 2 → R which assigns to every strategy x ∈ X and payoff function p : X 2 → R some expected payoff value
social opinion rule and
is a social opinion structure and λ i , γ i ∈ [0, 1] are given degrees of optimism and pessimism for each player i = 1, 2.
(d) A strategy tuple x ∈ X 2 is a social opinion equilibrium for a given social opinion
is a Nash equilibrium in the modified game (X 2 ,π) witĥ
The social opinion equilibrium concept incorporates the idea that public opinion is formed in society and this opinion is represented by a pessimistic as well as an optimistic outlook as well as what is understood to be the worst and the best payoff possible. The players rationally incorporate these opinions into their payoff function and then play best responses to the strategies selected by the other players. This equilibrium concept is tailored for application in games in which the players are influenced by the same worldview, reflected in the application of the same social opinion rules. This concept is, therefore, most appropriate for use in models of the commons (and others) within one relatively homogeneous society. In more localized applications, it may be more appropriate to consider a symmetric restriction of the above definition, to capture uniformity of the degrees of optimism and pessimism as enforced by the players' social milieu and the public discourse that influences them. Definition 2.3 Let Γ = (X 2 , π) be some game with a common strategy set. A strategy tuple x ∈ X 2 is a symmetric social opinion equilibrium if x is a social opinion equilibrium for a
The notion of a symmetric social opinion equilibrium additionally reflects the public discourse on how optimistic and pessimistic these players are. Indeed, only in widespread public discourse situations, a coordination of the degrees of optimism and pessimism would emerge. This is similar to the emergence of a "world view" on the state of emission controls and the ongoing abatement negotiations.
We investigate a simple version of the tragedy of the commons, adapted from Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2001) . 2 There are two players. Each player i ∈ {1, 2} chooses an activity level
, where a > 0 are given parameters. The payoff of each player i is
The upper bound of a player's activity x i is that value which results in zero payoff even if the other player is inactive. The lower bound is that of inactivity.
3
The Nash equilibrium activity levels x * 1 , x * 2 are
The resulting Nash equilibrium payoff level for each player is
The socially optimal state is assumed maximize the sum of payoffs. For reference, the socially optimal activity level of each player iŝ
which results in the payoffŝ
We use the standard Nash equilibrium and the social optimum as benchmarks in our discussion of various social opinion equilibria.
Equilibrium under Extreme Social Opinions
In the common resources or tragedy of the commons model that we consider here, the highest payoff a player can receive, given her own activity level x i , is attained when the other player's activity level is zero, i.e., x −i = 0. This corresponds to an optimistic social opinion rule 
On the other hand, each player i's extreme pessimistic beliefs are founded on the premise that her minimal payoffs are attained when the other player's activity is as large as possible, which means x −i = a. This corresponds to a pessimistic social opinion rule F p E defined by F p E (x, p) = p(x, a), implying that the (extreme) pessimistic beliefs of each player i are formulated as
In the setting of the extreme social opinions, we consider symmetric degrees of optimism and pessimism versus asymmetric ones. The symmetric case is given by (λ, λ, F o E ; γ, γ, F p E ) and the asymmetric one by (λ 1 , λ 2 , F o E ; γ 1 , γ 2 , F p E ), where γ 1 γ 2 and λ 1 λ 2 . These two cases are discussed in the next two subsections.
Symmetric Degrees of Optimism and Pessimism
Under extreme opinions with symmetric degrees of optimism and pessimism, represented by (λ, λ, F o E ; γ, γ, F p E ), player i's modified payoff function is, according to equation (2),
The social opinion equilibrium for the symmetric social opinion (λ, λ, F o E ; γ, γ, F p E ) is now denoted as an symmetric equilibrium under extreme social opinions. We compute from (9) for i = 1, 2 that each player's first order condition for the social opinion equilibrium is given by
This results into an equilibrium under extreme social opinions given by
The resulting payoffs for this equilibrium under extreme social opinions is thus derived as A numerical analysis of these equilibrium payoffs results in the graphs depicted in Figure 1 . We note that the efficiency losses from social opinion formation can be significant. However, the analysis also shows that for every degree of optimism there corresponds a certain degree of pessimism such that the resulting equilibrium is fully optimal. This implies that under symmetric extreme social opinions, social opinion formation can guide us to a more efficient state. In any case the efficiency losses can, in principle, be limited by the appropriate guidance through social opinion formation.
Our analysis can be summarized as follows:
Theorem 3.1 Under proper symmetric extreme social opinions, we derive the following insights:
there is a degree of pessimism γ * (λ) such that λ + γ * (λ) 1 and the corresponding symmetric social opinion equilibrium under extreme social opinions results into a Pareto optimal extraction from the commons.
(ii) For every degree of pessimism 0 γ < 1 2
there exists a threshold value λ γ of the degree of optimism such that (a) above that threshold value λ γ an increase in the degree of optimism λ > λ γ results into an increased overuse of the commons in the corresponding symmetric social opinion equilibrium, and (b) below that threshold value λ γ a decrease in the degree of optimism λ < λ γ results into an increased underuse of the commons in the corresponding symmetric social opinion equilibrium.
In the context of the statements in the theorem, we point out the various limit cases of complete or "unbridled" social optimism and pessimism. First, under unbridled optimism represented by λ = 1 and γ = 0, social opinion formation results into an equilibrium with
and π
On the other hand, unbridled pessimism is represented by λ = 0 and γ = 1 resulting into an equilibrium with
This case is equally disastrous; unbridled social pessimism leads to apathy and complete depletion of payoffs as well.
Asymmetric Degrees of Optimism and Pessimism
In this subsection we impose extreme social opinions regarding the behavior of the players, as in subsection 3.1, but do not require that these social opinions are symmetric. Instead, we allow for any degrees of optimism and pessimism, which complicates our analysis significantly. We first consider the general case, but subsequently limit our scope to what can be considered antagonistic opinions in which one player is never optimistic and the other player is never pessimistic. Under this form of antagonism, first best optimality is no longer possible. Under general degrees of optimism and pessimism (λ 1 , λ 2 ) and (γ 1 , γ 2 ), player i has the modified expected payoff function, adapted from (9), given by
Therefore, the equilibrium is the solution of the simultaneous maximization problems
max
At an interior solution, the first order conditions are
The solution is described through the equilibrium strategies given by
The superscript "AE" reminds us that this is the solution of the model when we have asymmetric players with extreme social opinions.
In general it is impossible to infer unambiguous conclusions from the general formulations derived above. Therefore, we focus on a limit case of antagonism between the two players in the common resources game. We assume that one player is optimistically biased and the other player is pessimistically biased. The optimistically biased player (i) is not influenced by pessimistic attitudes whatsoever, represented by setting the degree of pessimism of this player to zero: γ i = 0. This corresponds roughly to the attitude displayed by the current US administration with regard to global warming through emissions of greenhouse gasses. Simultaneously, we consider the other player (−i) to be pessimistically biased. This is represented by assuming that this player has no degree of optimism and λ −i = 0. This corresponds roughly to the attitude of other western countries, in particular the European Union (EU) in the emission reduction negotiations.
Using the introduced restrictions in this antagonistic case, we modify (18) to derive that the antagonistic social opinion equilibrium activity levels are given by
Tedious computation confirms that i's activity level is more than the efficient level of a/4, while −i's is less if γ −i is large enough. However, the sum x
is unambiguously more than the efficient level of a/2, so we have overuse of the commons.
The comparative statics now are clear-cut. We find the following.
The interpretation of this result is that as the optimistically biased player becomes more optimistic, her activity level increases. This is consistent with the general insight from the literature that optimism leads away from efficient choices in situations of the provision of a public good, although we do not know of any previous analysis that has shown this in an asymmetric model like ours. Similarly, we derive that
This implies that the pessimistically biased player reacts to the increase in optimism of the other player by reducing its harmful activity. We can also see what the overall effect on the activity will be by a change in λ i . This is simply the sum of the two partial derivatives we have just calculated, and it equals
We see that the increase in the optimist's activity level clearly over-compensates the decrease of the pessimist's activity. 4 We also look at the effect of an increase in the degree of pessimism γ −i of the pessimistically biased player. We derive that
Hence, if the pessimist becomes more so, the optimist takes advantage by increasing its own activity level. The effect on the pessimist's own activity level is
We see that the pessimist reduces activity level drastically in response to an increase in its pessimism. In fact, it is also true that the total activity level is reduced:
We summarize our results in this subsection in the following.
Theorem 3.2 Consider the tragedy of the commons under asymmetric, extreme social opinions with one optimistically biased player, the "optimist", with γ i = 0 and one pessimistically biased player, the "pessimist", with λ −i = 0. Then the following statements can be made:
(i) There is always overuse in the resulting extreme social opinion equilibrium.
(ii) An increase in the degree of optimism of the optimistic player increases that player's activity level, reduces the pessimist's activity level, and increases the sum of their activity levels.
(iii) Finally, an increase in the pessimist's degree of pessimism increases the optimist's activity level, decreases the pessimist's activity level, and decreases the sum of their activity levels.
Equilibrium under Leader-Follower Social Opinions
In this section we consider a more reasoned implementation of best and worst scenarios in social opinion formation in contrast to the extreme social opinions discussed in the previous section. Extreme opinions are based on the ultimate sanction that the other player can impose. This implies that such punishment is certainly not based on the best interest of the sanctioning player. Under moderate opinions, the "best" and the "worst" possible scenarios are based on the player's assumptions about her position in the structure of the interaction or negotiation process. In particular we consider that a player can be a leader or a follower. The leadership position corresponds to being a first mover in the negotiation process to which the other player-the follower-subsequently responds.
Thus, these moderate social opinions correspond to a sequential perspective on the commons provision game. The best case now is viewed as a sequential leadership position, while the worst case corresponds to the sequential follower position. Thus, we invoke the Stackelberg leadership model of a sequential determination of the strategic values of x i , i = 1, 2. As such, we denote these moderate social opinions as "Leader-Follower" (LF) opinions.
To determine these LF opinion rules, we compute the standard backward induction solution to a two-stage commons game. The follower's best response function derived from π is now determined as
Thus, the optimistic LF opinion rule can be defined as the opinion rule β(x) ). This results into a LF optimistic payoff function M S with
Subsequently, we determine the LF pessimistic opinion rule F p S as the one that is based on incorporating the best response function into the follower's payoff function:
where for each player i = 1, 2 we introduce
This results into a LF pessimistic payoff function m S given by
We now have introduced a moderate social opinion in the form of the LF social opinion represented by (λ 1 , λ 2 , F o S ; γ 1 , γ 2 , F p S ) with λ i , γ i 0 and λ i + γ i 1 for each i. The social opinion equilibrium under this LF (social) belief system is now denoted as an equilibrium under LF social opinions.
Symmetric Degrees of Optimism and Pessimism
In this subsection we impose symmetry of the degrees of optimism and pessimism, thus considering the case of (λ, λ, F o S ; γ, γ, F p S ). An equilibrium under LF social opinions now results into an expected payoff function π S given by
The resulting first order condition from (28) is now derived as
This results into equilibrium payoffs under symmetric LF social opinions given by
The resulting symmetric LF social opinion equilibrium payoffs are given by
First, we remark that full social optimality is achievable here if and only if λ = 0 and γ = 1, i.e., both players are fully pessimistic and adopt a follower attitude. The comparative statics results in this case are as follows:
As before, an increase in the common degree of optimism increases the use of the commons, while an increase in the common degree of pessimism decreases the use of the commons. (i) There always results overuse in the resulting LF social opinion equilibrium for all cases with some degree of optimism, i.e., for λ > 0.
(ii) There is a unique symmetric LF social opinion equilibrium in which full Pareto optimality is achieved and this is the fully pessimistic case, i.e., for λ = 0 and γ = 1.
(iii) An increase in the degree of optimism increases the overuse of the commons in the resulting symmetric LF social opinion equilibrium.
(iv) For λ > 0, an increase in the degree of pessimism decreases the overuse of the commons in the resulting symmetric LF social opinion equilibrium.
Asymmetric Degrees of Optimism and Pessimism
We turn now to the analysis of LF social opinions with asymmetric degrees of optimism and pessimism. As in the case of asymmetric degrees of pessimism and optimism for extreme social opinions, we again assume that one player is optimistically biased-the "optimist"-and the other player is pessimistically-biased-the "pessimist". Here we impose this restriction from the outset and throughout assume that γ i = 0 and λ −i = 0. The modified payoffs of the players are, adapted from (28):
The interior LF social opinion equilibrium values of the activity levels are given by
It can be verified by tedious computation that x AS i exceeds the optimal activity level of a/4, while x AS −i is less than a/4; the total activity x AS i + x AS −i is less than the efficient level of a/2, so LF social opinions in the (extreme) asymmetric case lead to underuse of the commons in the aggregate.
Turning to comparative statics, when the degree of optimism of the optimism changes, we find that 
The sum of these is positive:
When the degree of pessimism of the pessimist changes, we find that 
The sum of these is negative:
Our results are summarized below.
Theorem 4.2 Under asymmetry and LF social opinions, when one player is optimistic (γ i = 0) and the other is pessimistic (λ i = 0), we have the following properties:
(i) In the resulting LF social opinion equilibrium there is underuse of the commons.
(ii) Furthermore, an increase in the degree of optimism of the optimistic player increases that player's activity level, reduces the other's activity level, and increases the sum of their activity levels.
This implies that the commons is overburdened and the payoffs are lower than the regular Nash equilibrium payoffs, again minimal, π S o = 0.
• F   LF  : The equilibrium values of x under LF social opinions and full pessimism are given by
This implies that the usage of the commons is fully optimal and the payoffs are socially maximal, π 
For the case of LF values, we similarly derive that x S i =x i if and only if λ = 0 and γ = 1, i.e., decisions are made under full pessimism.
The analysis presented here is limited in the sense that our concepts are only stated within the context of a two-player tragedy of the commons game. Further analysis is necessary to understand how these concepts affect multiplayer games and more generalized settings, in particular beyond the standard commons case. At this stage, our limited results already show that social opinion formation is essential to understand important economic policy situations and require our full attention and understanding.
